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Abstract
Background: There is growing interest in the use and incorporation of empirical data in bioethics research. Much
of the recent focus has been on specific “empirical bioethics” methodologies, which attempt to integrate the
empirical and the normative. Researchers in the field are, however, beginning to explore broader questions,
including around acceptable standards of practice for undertaking such research.
The framework:
In this article, we further widen the focus to consider the overall shape of an empirical bioethics research project.
We outline a framework that identifies three key phases of such research, which are conveyed via a landscaping
metaphor of Mapping-Framing-Shaping. First, the researcher maps the field of study, typically by undertaking
literature reviews. Second, the researcher frames particular areas of the field of study, exploring these in depth,
usually via qualitative research. Finally, the researcher seeks to (re-)shape the terrain by issuing recommendations
that draw on the findings from the preceding phases. To qualify as empirical bioethics research, the researcher will
utilise a methodology that seeks to bridge these different elements in order to arrive at normative
recommendations. We illustrate the framework by citing examples of diverse projects which broadly adopt the
three-phase framework. Amongst the strengths of the framework are its flexibility, since (as the examples indicate) it
does not prescribe any specific methods or particular bridging methodology. However, the framework might also
have its limitations, not least because it appears particularly to capture projects that involve qualitative – as
opposed to quantitative – research.
Conclusions: Despite its possible limitations, we offer the Mapping-Framing-Shaping framework in the hope that
this will prove useful to those who are seeking to plan and undertake empirical bioethics research projects.
Keywords: Empirical bioethics, Methodology, Methods, Reflective equilibrium, Applied ethics, Integrated ethics
Background
For several decades, research in bioethics has seen an in-
creased interest in using and incorporating empirical
data [1, 2]. This interest manifests in myriad ways, from
bioethics research using empirical data to support em-
pirical premises in argument [3], through comment on
poor or unreflective use of empirical data in argument
[4], to attempts to fully integrate empirical analysis into
ethical theorising [5]. This latter activity, dubbed the
‘empirical turn’ in bioethics by some [1], but increasingly
simply referred to as ‘empirical bioethics’, is perhaps the
most controversial and challenging, requiring the devel-
opment of new methodologies that provide both
practical and theoretical solutions to the problem of
how to develop normative claims that are richly in-
formed by the empirical world but that do not fall into
the trap of ‘doing ethics by opinion poll’.
Some empirical bioethics might, however, be best
described as an attempt to grapple explicitly with the
interdisciplinary nature of the field. As Ives has argued
elsewhere, some accounts of empirical bioethics are less
about attempting to do something completely new, and
more about finding ways to better articulate and justify
methods already adopted in high quality, rigorous ap-
plied ethics [6].
Arguably, the focus of the empirical bioethics litera-
ture to date has been on interrogating and articulating
the process of integration through which the empirical
and the normative are combined, in some way, to
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generate ‘should’ or ‘ought’ conclusions. A 2015 system-
atic review, for example, identified 32 different method-
ologies that attempt to articulate an integration method
[7]. More recently, a move away from this explicit focus
has been demonstrated in a consensus statement from a
group of European researchers, which, building on
others’ attempts [8], proposes standards of practice for
empirical bioethics research [9]. This consensus state-
ment reported agreement on standards of practice about
the conduct and reporting of the integration process,
but also looked more broadly at, inter alia, aims, re-
search questions and training. The focus, however, on
integration and standards of practice has come at the
expense of substantive engagement with overarching
method and process in empirical bioethics research. In-
tegration is just one – though certainly essential – part
of an empirical bioethics research project, but we must
not neglect the other elements. Empirical bioethics re-
search, as a whole, entails much more than an integra-
tive analysis.
Given this, there may be advantages to thinking about
the research process as a whole, from start to finish, in
addition to its discrete parts. We have in mind not only
the different phases of a particular research project, but
also the different elements (or projects) that make up
programmes of research, which are intended to be
brought together to answer a core set of research ques-
tions. For brevity, we will typically refer to research pro-
jects. Thinking about the project (or programme) as a
whole entails thinking about what comes before and/or
after the specific point in the research where we might
be looking to combine the empirical with the normative.
It is this specific point of integration that has arguably
received most attention in the literature, and our aim
here is to broaden our gaze to consider how the entire
research project (or programme) might be constructed
and in so doing position the question of integration,
properly, as one small part of a larger research process –
albeit, as we shall we, one that is definitive of empirical
bioethics research.
In the Centre for Ethics in Medicine, at the University
of Bristol, we have developed a framework in an attempt
to articulate three broad stages of empirical bioethics re-
search. The approach as presented here was developed by
Huxtable and Ives, primarily to help articulate methods
for a Wellcome Trust collaborative award, [10] but draws
on many years of engagement with the question of how to
articulate methods and methodology in bioethics research.
In what follows, we outline this (Bristol) framework, pro-
vide examples, and consider its limitations.
We are not, here, attempting to outline any specific
methodology for empirical bioethics. Rather, we are
attempting to articulate, and provide illustrations of, a
way to think about an empirical bioethics research
project holistically, and delineate between discrete re-
search phases – of which the empirical ethics integration
comprises only one – that together can contribute to an-
swering a complex research question.
The utility here is potentially two-fold. First, there can
be value in simply having terminology that allows us to
conceptualise and articulate, in a recognisable form, the
structure of a research project. Indeed, when we have
talked about this approach in research seminars, work-
shops and teaching, feedback has suggested that there is
value in having terminology that allows clear delineation
between the phases of research but also allows reflection
on how the phases interact. Second, having the termin-
ology allows us to look at the research process in terms
of separate but interlinked phases, and reflect on what
the role of a particular phase is or should be. This is the
value of broadening our gaze to cover the research pro-
ject as a whole, rather than just focussing on the point
of integration between the empirical and the normative.
That point of integration is very important, and a distin-
guishing feature of empirical bioethics, but we also need
to think carefully about how we get there, and to date
the methodological literature has paid relatively little at-
tention to the significant amount of research that needs
to be done in the lead up to integration.
The framework
Mapping, framing and shaping
The framework, which comprises three phases or stages,
can be conveyed via a landscaping metaphor: mapping,
framing, and shaping.
In the first, mapping, phase, the aim is to survey and
get a sense of the general terrain. To flesh out the meta-
phor, we have a sense of where we are, and we have
sense of what we want to do with the land (in the form
of questions or issues we wish to explore) – but before
we can landscape the terrain in front of us, we need to
know what it is we have to work with. Are there hidden
boulders? What kind of soil is there? Are there areas too
dense and impenetrable to be worth attempting to
shape? Are there natural lines that we can build into our
design or do we have to excavate the lot and re-build
from scratch? Essentially, before we start our project of
landscaping the terrain, we need to examine what is out
there and create a ‘map’ that will help us navigate and
plan. In a research project, led by their research ques-
tions, the researcher(s) will seek to understand the “state
of the art” and identify what is (not) known, specify gaps
in the literature, identify further questions, and identify
existing proposals for addressing such questions. This
phase should enable the researcher(s) to work out what
further work is now needed and (if needs be) hone their
research questions and intended approach accordingly.
As might be anticipated, this phase might involve some
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empirical inquiry, but it is likely to be literature-focused,
analysing previous scholarship, opinions and data, which
are drawn from the range of sources and disciplines that
best suits the project in question.1
In the second, framing, phase, the aim is to explore
specific areas of the mapped terrain that have been iden-
tified as either being in need of deeper exploration or
unmappable from our current vantage point.2 In our
metaphor, this is akin to commissioning specialist sur-
veys to tell us, for example, what kind of bedrock is
present, how stable certain areas are, whether there are
any endangered species that must be protected – all of
which will affect what we may want, or are able, to do
with the land. In a research context, this will often have
a focus on developing an understanding of how key is-
sues are experienced (or “framed”) by relevant stake-
holders. We may seek to frame, inter alia, questions,
problems, experiences or possible solutions, but the
common thread is that the issues are framed by the lived
experience of relevant stakeholders. To build the meta-
phor, we are looking in-depth from multiple different
angles to identify hidden tracks, perils, dips, rock forma-
tions or ravines that were not visible to us during the
mapping stage but will affect what we are able to do
with the land. Some of these may prove to be avoidable,
some may be removable, and some may be fixed features
of the landscape that we have no option but to accept
and design around. Here, more finely-grained perspec-
tival information is gathered – essentially from experi-
enced travellers who have already traversed the terrain –
which (again) might shed light on what is (not) known,
reveal further questions, and/or indicate possible ways
forward. This phase is empirical in orientation and, de-
pending on the study and its research questions, re-
searchers might seek to gather and analyse data from a
variety of stakeholders in order to better understand the
area and the perceptions and judgments of its occupants.
In the first two phases, the focus is on building an in-
depth and intimate understanding of the terrain, so that
we are in a position to determine how we want to shape
it and how it can be shaped. It is descriptive (insofar as
we describe what is there) but also critically normative
(insofar as we analyse the features we describe to deter-
mine how strong, flexible and/or navigable they are).
In the third, shaping, phase, the aim is to seek to (re)
shape the terrain, informed by the findings and analyses
generated while mapping and framing. Equipped with –
and attentive to – these different findings and the ana-
lysis thereof, the focus here is on formulating recom-
mendations for ways forward. In our metaphor, this is
the development of a landscaping design that will re-
shape the terrain into its desired form. Armed with an
intimate understanding and knowledge of the terrain,
the designer can build a vision for what s/he wants, and
explain why certain features have to be in certain places
– sometimes for aesthetic reasons, sometimes for prag-
matic reasons, and oftentimes aimed at an artful blend-
ing of the two. Sometimes, to reach the vision, a great
deal of effort will be put into removing or overcoming
an obstacle, but sometimes it may be more desirable or
necessary to work around it or amend the vision to ac-
commodate it. In research, this phase equates to the
drawing of normative conclusions and, for the research
to qualify as empirical bioethics, the researcher(s) will
draw on an explicit empirical bioethics methodology,
which will enable them to combine the different ele-
ments and explain how and why they accommodate the
varying demands presented by theory and their empirical
data. Here an additional metaphor might help: the meth-
odology in question, whatever it happens to be, will pro-
vide a bridge between the more abstract, literature-led
elements of the project (from the mapping phase), the
empirically-led elements of the project (from the framing
phase), and the normative, recommendations-focused
elements of the project (in the shaping phase) [5]. This
methodology must provide unifying structure, which
shows how the different elements combine – much like
the way a good landscaper will provide structure and
themes to blend the different elements of the terrain to-
gether so that it is easily traversed.
Illustrations
Whilst this articulation of our framework originated in
Bristol’s Centre for Ethics in Medicine, we should note
that it is not necessarily deployed in every project under-
taken in that Centre. We also suspect that others may be
doing something similar, albeit not articulating their
work in quite this way. We therefore believe that the
framework might well have wide relevance and utility
1This paper is concerned with empirical bioethics research specifically,
but it would be a valid question to ask whether this kind of ‘mapping’
exercise is useful – or even essential – for any and all ethics research.
Common sense would suggest that it is good – and essential –
academic practice to have a good sense of what the existing literature
says about a topic before writing about it, but there is still an
important question to ask about whether this kind of exercise should
– or should always be – systematic in nature. Sofear and Strech [11],
for example, have argued in favour of a more systematic approach to
literature reviews in ethics.
2It has been helpfully pointed out by a reviewer of this paper that the
term ‘framing’ has multiple connotations, and that we need to clarify
precisely how we are using this term, especially for non-native English
speakers. ‘Framing’, here, describes looking at a phenomenon from a
particular vantage point, or through a particular lens, in order to see/
understand it in a particular way. If we were to ‘frame’ a picture, for
example, we place a physical barrier at the edges of the image to
clearly demarcate the boundaries of where we should be looking and
focus attention on the image. Similarly, in ‘framing’ an ethical issue we
are – metaphorically – looking at the issue from a particular perspec-
tive and putting a ‘frame’ around it to focus our attention on that spe-
cific viewpoint and help us to see it more clearly.
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because, even if it is recognised and already intuitively
practiced, our framework provides a way of articulating
the research phases in a clear and recognisable form.
However, and certainly in the absence of empirical
inquiry, we would not suggest that the framework can
account for every form of empirical bioethics research,
wherever it is undertaken.
Irrespective of the scope of its application, we never-
theless consider this framework to be useful because it is
accommodating and pluralistic and, whichever precise
approach is taken or whichever empirical bioethics
methodology is applied (we will later refer to this as a
necessary ‘bridging methodology’), it clearly indicates
what we consider to be three key phases of empirical
bioethics research.3 These positive attributes can be il-
lustrated with reference to a selection of empirical bio-
ethics projects that have been, or are being, undertaken
by colleagues in the Bristol Centre, in which we have
been involved as researchers, collaborators or supervi-
sors. We note that our intention is not to critically
examine the methodological choices made in these pro-
jects, but rather to illustrate how they fit with the “Map-
ping-Framing-Shaping” phases, despite their often very
different methodological orientations.
Swift’s PhD project, which was completed in 2011,
provides our first illustration [12–14]. Swift sought to
explore the ethical dimensions of using “sham surgery”
(or “placebo surgery”) control groups in the context of
neurological research for Parkinson’s Disease. The three
phases of her project align perfectly with the Bristol
framework. First, she undertook a systematic literature
review, exploring the ethics of sham surgery. Secondly,
she undertook semi-structured interviews, using vi-
gnettes, with people with Parkinson’s Disease and their
close family members. Thirdly, she combined the data
and analysis from the first two phases to issue recom-
mendations. To bridge these elements, Swift adopted
Frith’s “symbiotic empirical ethics”, [15] which involved:
setting out the circumstances (via the literature review);
specifying theories and principles (via the literature, in
particular Foster’s account of research ethics) [16]; using
ethical theory as an analytic tool (i.e. using Foster’s frame-
work to analyse the empirical data); theory building (using
the empirical data to revise the relevant theory); and mak-
ing normative judgments (bringing together the theory
and the data).
Secondly, Birchley’s PhD project, which concluded in
2015, investigated the ethical aspects of “best interests”
decision-making in the paediatric intensive care setting
[17, 18]. Like Swift, Birchley aimed at establishing coher-
ence between the theoretical and empirical aspects of his
study. On Birchley’s account, his project involved the fol-
lowing (iterative) stages: undertaking a literature review to
identify established theoretical accounts; gathering qualita-
tive data from those with experience; developing his own
considered moral judgments through critical review of the
findings from the first two stages; seeking coherence be-
tween the preceding elements, using additional theory
where necessary; transparently documenting all the stages;
and repeating stages as necessary and airing the findings
and analysis with relevant groups ([17], pp. 115ff). Like
Swift’s work, this approach fits the Bristol framework, des-
pite there being significant differences in the detail of the
approach. For example, Birchley approached the literature
reviews differently (undertaking a critical interpretive re-
view of pertinent literatures, especially in ethics and law),
interviewed healthcare professionals as well as patients
and those close to them, and his bridging methodology was
based on “reflective equilibrium” [19].
Thirdly, Morley’s project, which concluded in 2018,
explored the concept of “moral distress” in nursing and
aimed to provide a definition of moral distress in order
to help clarify how it can be responded to. As in the pre-
vious projects, Morley aimed to achieve an integrated
analysis, collecting empirical data about nurses’ experi-
ence of moral distress to inform a normative definition.
The research broadly adopted feminist empirical bioeth-
ics as a bridging methodology, using “reflexive balancing”
to integrate the conceptual and empirical elements and
reach normative conclusions [6]. This began with a sys-
tematic literature review and narrative synthesis [20],
which led to the development of a working definition of
moral distress, but also identified a series of questions.
These questions were then explored in a feminist inter-
pretive phenomenological empirical investigation to cap-
ture the moral distress experience of UK nurses working
in critical care. Finally, the working definition was refined
in light of the empirical data and used to theorise a model
of moral distress, which was then systematically chal-
lenged and revised through reflexive balancing [6], to de-
velop an account of moral distress that was coherent and
defensible. Although Morley’s methods, and theoretical
orientation, differed from both Swift and Birchley, the
phases of research similarly fit into the mapping (literature
review), framing (empirical study) and shaping (theorising
and developing a model) framework.
The framework does not only lend itself to PhD pro-
jects, in which a sole researcher is primarily responsible
for the different elements of the study. As a final ex-
ample, in autumn 2018, a team of researchers from the
University of Bristol began work on a Wellcome Trust-
funded collaborative project, “Balancing Best Interests in
Healthcare, Ethics and Law (BABEL)” [10]. This five-
year project is led by colleagues from the Bristol Centre
for Ethics in Medicine and from Bristol’s Centre for
3It currently leaves aside what happens thereafter e.g. in generating
impact and evaluating any proposals if adopted.
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Health, Law, and Society. The project comprises four
work streams, each exploring different dimensions of
“best interests” decision-making, involving a wide range
of patients and professionals. As the project comprises
ethical and legal elements, the researchers look not only
to empirical bioethics research methodologies, but also
to socio-legal studies, and they also seek to explore ques-
tions of methodology in a dedicated work stream. How-
ever, the project as a whole explicitly adopts the
mapping, framing and shaping framework: literature re-
view methods include “systematic reviews of reasons”,
[11] empirical data are collected via various methods,
and the overarching methodology, like Morley’s project,
is based on Ives’ “reflexive balancing” [6]. This initially
involves identifying the moral problem, and looking to
theory, experience, or a mixture thereof. Thereafter,
there is disciplinary-naïve inquiry into the problem i.e.
exploring the literature and data to understand the prob-
lem and “find some basic value propositions, which can
act as quasi-foundational boundary principles” ([6], p.
311). The final stage involves seeking overall coherence
by systematically challenging the boundary principles
and explaining why particular principles are accepted or
rejected.
There are numerous other examples we could cite to
further illustrate the flexibility of this framework. Amongst
the other (previous and current) projects in our Centre to
note are those which adopt the “critical applied ethics”
[21] methodology, those which involve in-depth analysis
of legal and disciplinary decisions in the framing phase,
and those which anticipate including a consensus building
exercise in the final shaping phase [22]. As such, the
framework can help to delineate the different phases of
empirical bioethics research, but doing so does not impose
constraints on the researchers in terms of methodological
orientation or the more specific methods adopted. As we
have seen from these Bristol examples, literature reviews
can take different forms, the empirical phase can involve
various methods, and diverse “bridging” methodologies
can be deployed (for example, “reflective equilibrium” or
“symbiotic empirical ethics”).
Limitations?
The framework appears to be usefully pluralistic and ac-
commodating, but it might be objected that its breadth
is a potential source of weakness and, conversely, that it
is not actually as accommodating as it appears. We an-
ticipate three associated questions, although we think
each can be answered.
First, is this framework too accommodating i.e. too
broadly applicable? If so, then what, if anything, does
this framework add? Viewed superficially, the framework
is potentially banal, as the three key phases appear to
correspond with the approaches taken in a multitude of
studies in a multitude of disciplines and fields. Many
empirical studies in the social and health sciences will
begin with a literature review, proceed to empirical data
collection and analysis, and then conclude with the
provision of recommendations.
One response to this first set of questions is that this
similarity is a source of strength, as it should help to de-
mystify – and potentially enhance the credibility of –
empirical bioethics research for researchers operating in
other disciplines and fields. As such, empirical bioethics
research involves phases that will be familiar to those
working elsewhere. But beyond this, secondly, empirical
bioethics research remains a discrete endeavour. The
key point of differentiation, which unites the entire
endeavour of empirical bioethics research and is most
apparent in the framework’s third phase, is how such re-
search generates its recommendations. In short, empir-
ical bioethics research involves distinctive methodologies
that seek to bridge the abstract and the empirical to
propose normative recommendations.
There are a multitude of such bridging methodologies
[7], which provide some account of how the empirical
and the normative can be integrated to generate solu-
tions to ethical problems. Examples include the afore-
mentioned symbiotic bioethics [15], critical applied
ethics [21], and reflexive balancing [6], as well as par-
ticular varieties of reflective equilibrium [23] and alter-
native approaches like hermeneutic ethics [24]. These
methodologies might be somewhat mystifying to out-
siders (and even to some insiders), but they are what
makes empirical bioethics research a distinct endeavour.
The role of this bridging methodology is to show how
the various elements of the research, undertaken across
the mapping and framing phases, can be brought to-
gether and used (sometimes, but not always, alongside
ethical theory), to develop normative claims in the shap-
ing phase. As such, ‘Mapping-Framing-Shaping’ could
describe many kinds of research endeavour. But when it
is combined with a bridging methodology, it becomes
empirical bioethics.4
Studies which do not attend (sufficiently) to this bridg-
ing element might resemble our account of empirical bio-
ethics research in their phases, but they will likely best be
considered – and judged as – something other than em-
pirical bioethics research. Zoe Fritz’s – impressive – work
on DNACPR (do not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion) decisions provides a useful illustration.
Fritz’s collaborative project, which formed the basis of
her PhD [25], certainly appeared to proceed through –
and, indeed, beyond – the three phases of the Bristol
framework. First, she undertook literature reviews and
4We are explicitly not, in this paper, evaluating different kinds of
empirical bioethics ‘bridging’ methodologies.
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ethical analysis of DNACPR decisions [26]. Secondly,
she conducted a range of empirical work and related
analysis, including a questionnaire study [27], observa-
tional study [28], combined observational and interview
study [29], and an audit of practices [30]. Thirdly, she is-
sued recommendations, which took the form of the UFTO
(Universal Form of Treatment Options) [31]. These three
phases echo the Bristol framework. Beyond these, Fritz
also trialled and evaluated the UFTO [32], before playing
a role in the development of a further proposal, ReSPECT
(Recommended Summary Plan for Emergency Care and
Treatment) [33], which is being further trialled and evalu-
ated in different regions in the UK.
Fritz’s mixed-methods project broadly corresponds
with the Bristol framework, although it is an open ques-
tion whether it is strictly a project in empirical bioethics
research as we earlier defined this. The missing ingredi-
ent appears to be an explicit account of the bridging
methodology, which ties the different elements together
and marks out a project as ‘empirical bioethics’. This
might, of course, be attributable (at least in part) to
journal conventions, since the articles were published
separately. However, the omission also has a temporal
explanation: Fritz’s work began in 2008, since which
time there has been a significant expansion in the pub-
lished accounts of empirical bioethics methodologies.
Fritz has confirmed that there was no overarching,
bridging methodology from the outset [34], although, as
it proceeded, she drew on Dunn et al’s methodological
proposals [35]. The lack of an explicit bridging method-
ology is not a criticism of Fritz’s work, which is carefully
plotted and conducted, in line with the expectations
associated with the different methods with (and thus
fields in) which Fritz is working. Rather, this is simply an
illustration of the point that the Bristol framework is not
so broad that it encompasses virtually any project that
combines literature-led and empirical limbs and seeks to
issue recommendations: only those studies with the rele-
vant, explicitly articulated, empirical bioethics bridging
methodology will come within its remit.
The second and third questions take the opposite view,
that the framework is too narrow. Secondly, then, is this
framework limited to studies which involve qualitative,
as opposed to quantitative, empirical research? Certainly,
the Bristol Centre’s experience has been dominated by
qualitative methods (albeit a variety of these). Our sense
is that we are not alone in primarily tethering empirical
bioethics research to qualitative inquiries: many of the
different methodologies that are available seem also to
focus on these types of study.
We are, nevertheless, clear that the Bristol framework ac-
commodates quantitative work. Of course, the challenge –
for the field as a whole – lies in devising appropriate bridg-
ing methodologies for combining normative reflections
with quantitative data. Insights should be available from the
literature on, for example, consensus-building models [36],
although we suspect that such methodologies will re-
quire particular reflection on such contested issues as
the role and weight of experts’ contributions [37]. We
will leave these matters for elsewhere, save for
emphasising that – provided that appropriate method-
ologies can be devised – it seems plausible that the
direction of such research would still follow the three
phases depicted in our framework.
Thirdly, and related to these reflections, is the
framework limited to coherence-based, as opposed to
consensus-based, approaches to empirical bioethics re-
search? The examples we gave earlier all utilised
some sort of coherence-based methodology. However,
the framework and its three phases certainly do not
exclude consensus-led approaches, but it might re-
quire some adaption depending on the bridging meth-
odology employed. For example, a project might
begin with literature reviews, which inform empirical
data collection and analysis, and could then conclude
with a consensus exercise, such as a DELPHI, whose
key questions are informed by the previous phases
[37]. Alternatively, a project may begin with a litera-
ture review and then may run the second and third
phases in parallel – which may be so directed by vari-
ous “dialogical” methodologies [7]. As previously
noted, provided there is a relevant empirical bioethics
methodology which links the three phases, such work
can qualify as empirical bioethics research within the
framework we outline.
Conclusions
To briefly conclude, in this paper we have outlined our
framework for empirical bioethics research, which we
have articulated via a landscaping metaphor and illus-
trated with examples from our Centre’s research. The
three phases – ‘Mapping-Framing-Shaping’ – can be ap-
plied, we argue, to empirical bioethics research generally
without prescribing any specific methods or bridging
methodology. It therefore might be useful to researchers
who are in the process of planning projects, who need to
find a way of describing the overarching shape of a pro-
ject or programme of research in a way that will be fa-
miliar and acceptable to a range of disciplines, and yet
retain the much needed flexibility to use whichever
methods and empirical bioethics methodology is best
suited to their research question(s).
In short, we offer this framework not to prescribe a
singular way of carrying out empirical bioethics research,
but as an example of an approach that we have found to
work, and which may resonate usefully with others
working in the field.
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